


















Rear Admiral I. W. Linder J. R. Borsting
Superintendent Provost
This report summarizes a project which was partly supported by:
Naval Air Systems Command, Technology Administrator AIR-320, Work Request
No. 6-1063, Amendment No. A, dated 12 November 1975.
Reproduction of all or part of this report is authorized.
tv.1 « rpnnrt was prepared by:
"weaey, CALif0Rfil(A
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whan Dale Knr.r.rf)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONSBEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER
NPS-67Hp77021A
2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. ». RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtltla)
DECISION-MAKING AND OPTIMIZATION IN AIRCRAFT
DESIGN
S. TYPE OF REPORT a. PERIOD COVERED
February 1977
« PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. autmorc*;
Ulrich Haupt
• • CONTRACT OR GRANT NOMBERfa;
» PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME ANO ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT TASK
AREA * WORK UNIT NUMBERS
It. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS




1). NUMBER OF PAGES
65
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME * AOOn€$%(tl dlttarant from Controlling Otllca) IS. SECURITY CLASS, (ot thla rmpert)
UNCLASSIFIED
11a. DECLASSIFICATION/ DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ot thla Report)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ot tha ametrmct entered In Bloek 20, II dlttarant tram Raport)
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES





20. ABSTRACT (Cantlnua on raveraa aldm It naeaaamry mud identity my aleak wlirj
The state of the art in aircraft design is surveyed with regard to the decision-
making process. It is shown that the empirical approach to decision-making as
it is generally practiced in hardware design has inherent limitations. There
is an increasing need to consider uncertainties and preferences explicitly.
This leads to a new design outlook combining the experience of old-time design-
ers with an analytical approach to complex problems. An outline is given for
the development of practice-oriented text material as a most essential step
| toward preparing engineers for new tasks in design and decision-making.
mt'flTn 1473 EDITION OP I MOV • IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0102-014- «601 |
ii
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAOE (When Dale Knt

PREFACE
This report is the outcome of visits which were made during the past
year to the engineering departments of the following aircraft manufacturers:
Boeing Company, Seattle, WA,
Douglas Aircraft Company, Long Beach, CA
General Dynamics, Fort Worth, TX,
Grumann Aerospace Corporation, Bethpage, NY,
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Burbank, CA,
LTV Aerospace Corporation, Dallas, TX,
McDonnell Aircraft Company, St. Louis, MO,
Northrop Corporation, Hawthorne, CA,
Rockwell International, Los Angeles, CA.
The visits were sponsored by the Naval Air Systems Command and, thanks
to the excellent cooperation of the aircraft companies, the opportunity was
provided at each place to talk with a good number of those engineers who
have accumulated the broad experience so essential as a background for design.
Others with a personal interest in the decision-making process, at universities
and in engineering organizations, provided additional valuable comments. All
those who were contacted — too many to be listed by name — gave generously
of their precious time and their rich professional experience.
The author has been interested in basic aspects of aircraft design for
some time (Ref. 1 & 2) . His views are conditioned by a background of two
decades as an aeronautical engineer in industry and almost two decades as a
faculty member in the Aeronautics Department of the Naval Postgraduate School
and are tempered by the somewhat detached attitude of being an emeritus.
Nevertheless, conclusions drawn from a wide spectrum of well-considered
comments and reflections are unavoidably simplified and influenced by subjec-
tive observation and interpretation. They are the author's responsibility
and do not necessarily represent the policy of the NASC.
The reader who is familiar with recent developments in aircraft design
may conveniently skip Section 2, and the reader who is familiar with recent
developments in decision-making may skip Section 3. Or, if pressed for time







1.1 Objective and Method of Approach 3
1.2 Basic Developments in Aircraft Design 3
1.3 Aircraft Design and Decision-making 5
2. STATE OF THE ART IN AIRCRAFT DESIGN 8
2.1 Design Hierarchy 8
2.2 Typical Aspects of Design 11
2.2.1 Parametric Sizing 11
2.2.2 Optimization 12
2.2.3 Design Synthesis 15
2.2.4 Systems Design 19
2.2.5 Structures Design „ 21
2.2.6 Design Policy Decisions 22
2.3 Recent Trends 23
2.4 Essence of Design 26
2.5 Organization of Engineering 26
3. STATE OF THE ART IN DECISION-MAKING 28
3.1 Empirical Approach 28
3.2 Analytical Approach 30
3.2.1 General Considerations. . . 30
3.2.2 Utility, Preferences, and Information 32
3.2.3 Overall Perspective 35
4. SOME PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 37
4.1 Anticipating Future Developments 37
4.2 Design and Decision-making 38
4.3 Design and Engineering Education 40
4.4 General Implications 42
Section Page
5. PROBLEM AREAS AND BASIC NEEDS 44
5.1 Decision-making — General Problem 44
5.2 Decision-making — Specific Aspects. ... 46
5.3 Aircraft Design — Basic Problem 47
5.4 Aircraft Design — Specific Aspects 49




9. DISTRIBUTION LIST 60
1 . INTRODUCTION
1.1 Objective and Method of Approach
This report is concerned with the decision-making and optimization process
in the design of advanced aircraft systems. The objective is
to evaluate recent experience;
to clarify existing problem areas;
to establish basic needs and to arrive at conclusions and recommendations.
At first glance, decision-making and optimization in aircraft design has
a different appearance from the viewpoint of the vice-president of engineering
who is responsible for basic policy considerations, or from the viewpoint of
the project engineer who has to make major engineering decisions, or from the
viewpoint of the designer who has to make all the many daily decisions through-
out the design process. A closer look will provide a common denominator for
these various viewpoints and show the basic significance of the subject to
every aeronautical engineer.
To establish the proper perspective, a brief outline of some basic de-
velopments in aircraft design and of the role of decision-making serves as
an introduction. The two following chapters give a review of the present
state of the art in aircraft design and in decision-making. This leads to
a clarification of existing problem areas and a consideration of basic needs.
Finally the findings of the report are summarized, conclusions are drawn,
and two recommendations are made to initiate modest "seed" programs which
should provide tangible results.
1.2 Basic Developments in Aircraft Design
During the pioneering years of aviation, the aircraft designer frequently
was the central figure and the jack-of-all-trades — designer as well as main
resource person in aerodynamics, structures, materials, propulsion, and manu-
facturing, often also test pilot, entrepreneur and founder of great enterprises,
The Wright Brothers, Glen L. Martin, Breguet, DeHavilland, Fokker, Heinkel
and Sikorsky are just a few of the names which come readily to one's mind.
A creative spirit, clear grasp of essentials, and a confidence-inspiring,
self-assured personality were their characteristic traits. The knowledge
necessary to design an airplane was of a practical kind and for many years
it was no more than could be stored in the mind of a capable individual.
This first period had come to an end in the early 1930s. Evaluation
of wind tunnel tests in aerodynamics, thin plate analysis in structures,
thermodynamic efficiencies in propulsion, processing and forming techniques
in production — each of them developed into a field of specialization. The
designer could not possibly keep up with all the developments and had enough
difficulty to coordinate the different inputs coming from various specialists.
Yet the solid engineering background and the long experience of the typical
designer provided the know-how and the balanced judgment to translate new
theoretical knowledge into flying hardware. This period lasted from the years
of exciting technical progress in the 1930s, through the years of mass pro-
duction during World War II, to the expansion of air transportation in the
1950s.
In the late 1950s a slow change in attitude took place throughout air-
craft design. Partly due to the impetus given by missiles and spacecraft
which began to outshine aircraft, partly due to the demands of the military
who were striving for maximum performance, the importance and prestige of
the analytical specialists soared high. Specialists were needed to expand
the limits of scientific knowledge and to reach for ever higher performance.
The best minds were attracted by the challenges of research and development
which usually meant estrangement from design. As a result, the designer's
prestige declined. The analytical specialist was often the originator of
novel ideas and the designer, in all too many cases, played second fiddle as
he translated these ideas into practice.
Then, around 1970, began the big slump in the aircraft industry with a
reduction of the engineering force by about 25% (Ref . 3) . Simultaneously,
two developments of great potential impact and far-reaching effect on aircraft
design began to take place. Firstly, computer-aided design came of age and
is now in the process of relieving the designer of much of the earlier drud-
gery regarding the menial aspects of design. Secondly, the procurement policy
of the military underwent a thorough change: The earlier drive for maximum
performance has been superseded by a new quest for an optimal balance between
performance, life-cycle cost, reliability, maintainability, vulnerability,
and other "-ilities". The experience of the 1960s had shown that for mili-
tary aircraft the price for the last few ounces of performance is usually
excessive in terms of other characteristics and that the total overall system
has to be optimized, not just performance. The same lesson had been learned
earlier by the airlines where meticulous cost accounting had pointed toward
the possible savings due to improved reliability and maintainability.
These two trends — rapid growth of computer-aided design (CAD) and need
for system optimization — have developed into major aspects of aircraft de-
sign in the mid-1970s. Both put new demands on the designer but at the same
time they provide new vistas. CAD is a promising tool which can replace the
drafting board (a negative status symbol) by the screen with light pen and
keyboard (a positive status symbol). More important, it frees the designer's
mind for higher and more challenging tasks. Such a challenging task is system
optimization which has always been the ultimate but somewhat remote goal of
design. Now it comes within practical reach. CAD and system optimization
complement each other because CAD makes it easy to explore new ideas and
alternative solutions for overall optimization.
Viewed from this perspective, the designer will have to assume new and
broader responsibilities. Actually, they are not quite new. They are the kind
of responsibilities which the designer carried in times when the design posi-
tion held highest prestige and which were discarded more or less by default.
The present situation provides a promising opportunity to reappraise the role
of design.
1.3 Aircraft Design and Decision-making
Aircraft design has many aspects. Unfortunately, the general image has
been distorted during the past two decades by picturing the designer as mostly
concerned with nuts and bolts and slaving over the drawing board. It should
be more correct to think of the designer firstly as a creative engineer;
secondly as a master planner who has to anticipate how the design will stand
up in the future; and thirdly as a design manager who has to understand the
essence of many different fields of specialization in order to balance the
often conflicting recommendations of specialists.
In terms of mental disciplines, design requires some basic qualities:
creative imagination and inventiveness to produce alternative ideas and to
visualize their consequences; analytical thinking to provide the necessary
depth of perception; and a sense of synthesis to develop the width of per-
spective for making a prudent decision between alternatives.
The much neglected but very pervasive aspect of decision-making in design
forms the main subject of this report. To appreciate it one must realize
the basic difference between science and engineering. Science is concerned
with fundamental understanding. It starts with a clearly defined problem and
if the original problem is too difficult for solution, it is simplified or
subdivided until it can be analyzed and the correct solution is found. During
the past two decades, in a climate of rapidly expanding frontiers of science,
the analytical methods of science played the dominant role.
Engineering, however, is much more than a mere application of science.
It is concerned with creating technical products to fulfill human needs.
The engineering process begins with the concept of a goal which may be
achieved in different ways. The goal is often poorly defined and takes firmer
shape only gradually. Each component of a solution has to be analyzed, but
all components have to be integrated and decisions have to be made regarding
the choice between various alternatives. The main burden of decision-making
falls upon design, which is the planning stage of engineering. Design deci-
sions have to be made not only by the chief designer who is responsible for
all aspects of a design but just as well by the detail designer who may be
responsible only for a small attachment bracket. Decision-making accompanies
the designer throughout his career.
These few remarks may suffice as an introduction. Their purpose is to
focus attention on the unique situation which has developed in aircraft design
in the past few years. CAD provides the means for man-computer communication
in real time and for optimizing a well defined design concept. However, it
does not relieve the designer from decision-making. On the contrary, it
brings out decision-making as the principal task of design at all levels.
For about two decades the significance of decision-making and the corre-
sponding implications have been overshadowed by a preoccupation with analy-
tical methods. A different trend began tenderly in the early 1960s and was
well documented in the Educational Development Project of the University of
California at Los Angeles. A new emphasis in engineering education was to
be given to design as an iterative decision-making activity. Yet this idea
was ahead of its time. Neither engineering education nor industry were ready
to give much thought to the decision-making process in design.
It appears that the time should be more favorable now. Much has happened
throughout the world during the past decade to make us realize that a
deterministic-analytical mind is necessary for the perfection of details but
is not sufficient to make important decisions. Awareness of uncertainties
and integration of details into a larger system are needed. Both analysis
and synthesis have to complement each other. Decision-making in aircraft
design is just one aspect of this.
2. STATE OF THE ART IN AIRCRAFT DESIGN
2.1 Design Hierarchy
Design consists of a hierarchical sequence of steps. It begins with ideas
and concepts; takes successively firmer shape until the configuration can
be frozen; continues with the practical considerations about hardware; and
leads to a set of manufacturing instructions and airworthiness documentation.
We will steer clear of labeling the various levels and phases because enough
overlap and confusion exist already in names and definitions. Yet it should
be useful to summarize what goes into the design process and to show how the
designer's outlook changes as the design progresses.
The initial step of design is concerned with formulating concept and
objective; studying the feasibility of an approximate configuration; exami-
ning proposed mission and operation of the final product; clarifying needs,
criteria, assumptions, and constraints; appraising available resources of
know-how, man-power, equipment, and funding; evaluating uncertainties and
competition; establishing priorities; and estimating impact and consequences.
All this is based on much experience, a realistic appraisal of given facts,
and a few rough calculations. The decisions are directed toward go/no go of
the project.
The next step is concerned with parametric sizing. It begins with the
analytical relationships between design and performance parameters, which
have to be refined eventually by windtunnel data to support performance es-
timates. Alternative solutions are compared and trade-offs are carried out
on the level of parametric studies. Variation of parameters is an iterative
analytical process directed toward synthesis - namely to find an optimal
configuration which can be frozen with respect to overall dimensions. Such
parametric studies are based on laws of physics as well as on experience which
considers many aspects. The decisions are directed toward an optimal geometry
of the aircraft.
Hardware design is a continuation of this formative process. Within the
constraints imposed by the chosen configuration it is concerned with the
actual hardware of structures and systems. Alternative solutions and tradeoffs
have to be considered just as in parametric studies — but now the practical
level of hardware replaces the abstract level of parameters. Each component
part is analyzed from the separate viewpoints of function, strength, cost,
reliability, producibility, maintainability, etc. Structural and functional
tests may be required for verification. The emphasis is on engineering know-
how. Decisions are directed toward manufacturing.
Finally design has to supply manufacturing instructions in form of a
drawing or a tape for numerically controlled production. In addition, airv
worthiness must be documented by analysis or demonstrated by tests. All
the information developed previously must be followed up thoroughly, integra-
ted, verified and recorded. Close liaison with manufacturing, inspection,
and customer acceptance is required and the emphasis is on full attention
to final details. Decisions are directed mainly toward clarification.
Beyond this there is another phase of design. It is usually called pro-
duct support and pertains to the liaison between service experience and de-
sign. Some maintenance problems always develop after the introduction of
a new type of aircraft and designers have to take part in the trouble-shooting,
Or, on the other hand, when an aircraft has matured into a successful model,
there usually develops a demand for modifications, growth versions, and in-
corporation of advanced technologies which pose many challenges for the
designer.
All this indicates a consistent continuity reaching from the first de-
sign concept to the last design modification which may take place more than
two decades later. In addition to this chronological set of activities, one
can speak of a design hierarchy — not in the sense of an authoritative pro-
cess but in the sense of an orderly arrangement of responsibilities which
are different at each level. For instance, in the early conceptual phases
of design it is established whether the wing-fuselage intersection should
be high-wing, mid-wing, or low-wing; wing area and geometry are determined
later on the parametric level of design; spar, stringer, and rib arrangement
early on the hardware level of design; bolt and rivet sizes or material pro-
cessing only in the final phases of design.
At any level previous decisions have become constraints and no new de-
cisions must be made without anticipating all possible consequences. This
continuity is expressed in the term design hierarchy. It implies a double
responsibility — for analysis appropriate to the level of design as well
as for synthesis regarding the entity of the design process.
The term design hierarchy also implies two different viewpoints in design.
The system designer is concerned primarily with the end product which consists,
of course, of many components. The component designer is concerned primarily
with a specific component which, of course, has to be integrated with many
other components to result in a system. Therefore, the system designer
starts from an abstract goal to arrive at the necessary physical aspects
while the component designer starts from practical physical aspects to arrive
at a final end product. Design comprises both viewpoints.
The two viewpoints have been accentuated by two different kinds of ex-
perts. For systems design there* is the systems engineer who is an expert on
the general aspects of integrating many components. For component design
there are many technological specialists who are experts on performance,
stability, fatigue, fracture mechanics, corrosion, producibility, cost, re-
liability, etc. As the old saying goes: the generalist learns less and
less about more and more until he knows nothing about everything while the
specialist learns more and more about less and less until he knows everything
about nothing.
For about two decades the designer has been increasingly squeezed between
systems engineers and technological specialists. If systems engineers provide
width of perspective and technological specialists provide depth of perception,
what are the functions and responsibilities of the designer?
There is no unanimity about an answer to this question. Yet the differ-
ences refer more to nuances than to substance. The considerations throughout
this report about the present situation, problem areas, and basic needs lead
to a design outlook which will be summarized in the conclusions.
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2.2 Typical Aspects of Design
Consideration of some typical aspects of design may help to clarify the
design process from the viewpoint of decision-making.
2.2.1 Parametric Sizing
Parametric sizing is concerned with the trade-offs which are characteris-
tic of the early phases in the design of an aircraft. The purpose is to deter-
mine the best aircraft configuration which satisfies specified performance
and mission requirements. This is an iterative process of trial and error
by varying some chosen parameters while other variables are held constant.
Among the many possible solutions the designer has to decide which one to
choose. Vice versa, the performance resulting from chosen design parameters
is determined as a closed solution.
The various parameters can be grouped as design parameters (e.g. wing
loading, thrust loading, aspect ratio), performance parameters (e.g. speed,
rate of climb, turn radius), mission parameters (e.g. range, flight trajec-
tory, maneuver load factor), and technology parameters (e.g. structural
weight, C /C- , specific fuel consumption) . The number and type of design
parameters to be used depend on purpose and level of the investigation.
During the early phases of advanced design unnecessary details must be avoided
not only because they cost computer time but also because they mean undesira-
ble constraints downstream. For subsequent phases which are more refined,
the geometric parameters of the wing, for instance, may include not only wing
area, sweepback, aspect ratio, taper ratio, and thickness ratio but also airfoil
characteristics and size and deflection of flap and slat. Final performance
parameters depend on the results of windtunnel tests.
The relationships between design parameters and performance and mission
parameters become quite complex for high-performance aircraft. It is feasi-
ble to establish them in separate modules for aerodynamics, propulsion, mass
properties, structures, or cost, so that they can be updated and refined under
the jurisdiction of each discipline. Yet at the same time the modules are
integrated so that data can be transferred from one module to another.
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Computerization has made it possible to investigate the large number
of parameters at various combinations in a short time. Computer programs
have been used either in batch mode or, increasingly, in the interactive
graphics mode. The latter offers, of course, the important advantage of
rapid man-computer interaction with display on the cathode-ray tube (CRT).
As an idea flashes across the designer's mind, the CRT provides quantitative
data about its implications within seconds. The designer can modify initial
questions by a touch of the light pen or of the alpha-numerical keyboard *•- a
gradual evolution from parametric analysis to design-oriented analysis.
For an innovative design, development of a computer program is a major
task. On the other hand, for a conventional design the basic equations are
well established and the program usually begins with a baseline configuration
for airframe and engine. Modifications are made by scaling the design para-
meters of various components separately to satisfy mission and performance
requirements. The output of a typical program for parametric sizing consists
of data for geometry, component weights, balance, and performance. Addition-
al data on cost and structures can also be obtained from corresponding input
modules.
From the viewpoint of decision-making, computerized parametric sizing
provides a large amount of information in a form which can easily be interpreted.
Trade-offs and sensitivities can be assessed and the decision-maker is pro-
vided with the information to make a rational decision. Yet availability
of information is only one of the ingredients of the decision-making process.
Parametric sizing by itself remains an analytical trial-and-error process
and gives no assurance about optimization.
2.2.2 Optimization
Optimization requires a clear definition of what is to be optimized and
this is frequently quite elusive. A clear-cut problem may consist of finding
minimum weight or maximum rate of climb. More often optimization means the
proper balance between several characteristics which may be ill-defined or
subject to various influences or vacillations of opinion. In such cases an
objective function depends on a multi-dimensioned set of criteria. The ob-
jective function is a mathematical expression of the decision-maker's value
system in terms of design parameters and it will be discussed further in
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Section 3.2.1. Different types of aircraft are optimized with respect to
different criteria.
For transport aircraft with specified performance characteristics, opti-
mization is usually required with respect to direct operating cost in cents
per seat mile. Yet other considerations such as noise footprint or fuel
consumption per seat mile may easily assume a major role when supersonic
transports are considered.
For some military aircraft, optimization is required with respect to
mission effectiveness. Many other military aircraft have to be optimized
with respect to life-cycle cost which, under peacetime conditions, amounts
to several times the initial acquisition cost. This includes cost of develop-
ment and production as well as operation and maintenance over the life span
of the aircraft. Until recently the military services were mostly concerned
with acquisition cost and as a consequence statistical data on operational
cost are not very plentiful.
For fighter aircraft, optimization is required with respect to "wins"
in air combat. This is established by an additional simulator loop which
can be incorporated into a computer program. The simulator consists of the
aircraft's cockpit, equipped with flight controls, instruments, and intercon-
nected visual display systems and a correspondingly equipped cockpit of an
adversary aircraft. The pilot in each cockpit operates in real time through
digital and analog computer equipment in accordance with design and perfor-
mance data of each aircraft. Each cockpit may be movable to produce acceler-
ation on the pilot, and all data are recorded for subsequent analysis as a
function of design parameters. Both characteristics of the aircraft and
actions of the pilot form a unity which has to be optimized.
Beyond the problems of defining criteria for the objective function,
there are considerable mathematical difficulties connected with the optimi-
zation procedure itself. Design problems often have so many variables with
interdependent constraints that the use of differential calculus or graphical
methods is not feasible. Employing numerical optimization methods is more
practical and has the additional advantage that they lend themselves easily
to automation.
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Much progress in numerical optimization has been made during the last
decade. Any design can be defined by a vector in multidimensional space
where each design variable represents a different dimension. Since we cannot
see in more than three dimensions, the general case is beyond our power of
visualization. Yet the principle is the same as when we assume only two varia-
bles in a base plane and plot above this plane a curved surface representing
the objective function which depends on the two variables and which is to be
optimized. The objective function may express cost, weight, range, aerody-
namic or propulsive efficiency, return on investment, or any combination of
parameters. It is subject to functional constraints in accordance with given
relationships between parameters and also to regional constraints which may
be specified for the upper or lower bounds of parameters. The regional con-
straints define the permissible part of the curved surface where the optimum
value has to be found, e.g. limits due to minimum sheet thickness, maximum
stress, stalling speed, etc.
There are a good number of numerical search programs available to find
the optimum value on the surface of the objective function. One of them is
CONMIN ( Constrained Function Minimization) which was developed by NASA Ames
and is described by Vanderplaats in Ref. 4. The search begins from an ini-
tial point in the n-dimensional "design space". From the corresponding point
on the objective function it follows a method of feasible directions. A
direction of steepest descent is calculated by finite differences. This de-
termines the direction of search which is followed until either a minimum
or a constraint is reached. When the search direction leads to a local minimum
of the objective function, a modified steepest descent direction is calculated
and followed. When the search direction leads to a constraint boundary, a
new direction of search is determined by bisecting the tangents to the con-
straint boundary and to the contour of constant objective. In most practical
cases the minimum of the objective function in the permissible region is
approached or reached in 5 to 10 iterations. The computer logic includes,
of course, many refinements which are beyond the scope of this brief outline.
This optimization takes place within a given design concept. The final choice
among various optimized design concepts offers no difficulties as they will
be measured on the same scale and can easily be ranked.
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As emphasized in Ref. 4, a very essential aspect of such an automated
optimization program is that it can be coupled with an analysis program.
To make this possible, a few basic rules must be observed in writing the
analysis program — for instance, using standard language; segmenting each
program into input, execution, and output; and storing in a single identifi-
able location all parameters that may be objectives or design variables or
that may be constrained.
Modification of an existing analysis program for coupling it with an
automated optimization program can usually be done in less than one man-day
of programming time. With the truly tremendous numbers of analytical compu-
ter programs which are available, it now becomes easy to take a step which
has been quite formidable up to now: from the specialist's emphasis on
analysis to the designer's outlook toward synthesis and optimization.
2.2.3 Design Synthesis
The term design synthesis is now usually applied to the automated sys-
tematic approach toward designing a system or subsystem. Design synthesis
on the parametric level combines the procedures of parametric sizing with
automated optimization as described in the two preceding sections. The input
consists of the analytical relationships established for parametric sizing
and of the objective function in terms of the parameters. The output con-
sists of optimized design parameters.
Design synthesis is applicable to problems of many kinds and during
various phases of design. Up to now most efforts have been directed to the
early design phases where parameters are readily expressed in quantitative
terms. A clearly formulated objective function and accurate analytical ex-
pressions for the relationships between parameters are the basic requirements.
The answer cannot be expected to be creative or innovative — obviously it
is only an optimization of the design concept incorporated in the computer
input. Yet with design synthesis it becomes feasible to explore many different
design concepts and evaluate the optimum solution of each on an equal basis
before a design decision is made.
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An excellent survey of design synthesis in the early 1970s is given by
Straub in Ref. 5 which summarizes various design synthesis projects under-
taken by industry. To illustrate what can be accomplished in parametric
design at present, in the mid-1970s, we may consider a particularly general
and comprehensive program which has been developed at NASA Ames as ACSYNT
(Aircraft Synthesis) and is described by Vanderplaats in Ref. 6. The modules
incorporated in the ACSYNT program represent more than 100 man-years of
development over a period of more than 10 years as mentioned by Gregory in
Ref. 7.
ACSYNT has a control module which consists of three parts. The first
part performs convergence to identify an aircraft which satisfies given speci-
fications. The designer estimates the gross weight of a baseline configura-
tion and the computer compares this with the sum of empirically calculated
structural weights in addition to the weights of fuel, payload, and equipment.
Since the weights of structure and fuel depend on design and mission parame-
ters, an iterative process is necessary to maka estimated and calculated
weights the same, resulting in an initial converged gross weight. This will
define the objective function but will generally not be a minimum and may
not satisfy constraints such as field length, fuel volume requirements, etc.
The second part of ACSYNT optimizes the gross weight (or any other parameter)
and carries out the sizing function using the CONMIN program. The third part
performs a sensitivity function which automatically varies a single design
parameter to determine the effect of this parameter on the design of the air-
craft. Convergence, optimization, and sensitivity modules are integrated
within ACSYNT and incorporate the separate discipline modules in geometry,
mass properties, aerodynamics, propulsion, and structures. A cost module
can be added. The output data are either in print or on the CRT.
Application of ACSYNT to a typical design study of a military aircraft
for a given mission profile is discussed by Vanderplaats and Gregory in Ref.
8. The goal of this early design study is to define configuration concepts
and to identify research requirements. The gross weight is minimized by
finding the proper combination of five parameters: wing loading, thrust
loading, wing aspect ratio, thickness ratio, and sweep. Fuselage size and
fineness ratio are kept constant. Using only these five parameters, an
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accuracy of about 10% in gross weight can be expected from correlations with
existing aircraft.
For the specified mission profile and the five chosen parameters conver-
gence and optimization of gross weight were accomplished in less than A minutes
on the CDC 7600 computer. Various" mission definitions would obviously mean
different optimized gross weights and design configurations. To determine
the effects on gross weight and performance due to changing design parameters,
a good many sensitivity analyses were conducted and many of them required re-
optimization. Of particular interest is the sensitivity to technology factors,
e.g. reduction in structural weight or in C . This indicates fields where
research promises the highest benefits. Ref. 8 mentions 20 to 30 hours on
a CDC 7600 computer as typical for a sensitivity study to 5 to 10 mission
parameters and 3 to 5 technology parameters for each basic aircraft concept.
Computer time increases about linearly with the number of parameters. Also
the complexity of the mission profile has considerable influence because this
may easily become the most time-consuming item in the various discipline
modules. The computer time should be distributed over approximately two weeks
to give the designer time for interpretation and discussion with specialists.
ACSYNT exemplifies how deeply and quickly a design concept can be inves-
tigated by design synthesis. There is, however, another aspect to design
synthesis. This is the concern with the continuity of design from the con-
ceptual phase to the final detail phase and with the integration of all as-
pects. For an integrated, interactive approach to analysis and design func-
tions, the Computer Aided Technology Project at McDonnell Aircraft Company
is representative as described by La Favor and Doelling in Ref. 9 and by
English in Ref. 10. The basic principle is to coordinate computer routines
developed separately in various engineering disciplines and to provide a rapid
transfer of data between programs. The project is open-ended and many parts
still have to be filled in but the already existing interactive graphic
modules are impressive:
ICADE (Interactive Computer Aided Design Evaluation) is a program for
parametric configuration sizing and performance analysis. It determines if
the flight performance requirements and vehicle size are compatible and
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serves. to evaluate specific design or performance trade-offs, starting from
a baseline design concept. CALL (Computer Aided Loft Lines) establishes a
common mathematical data base defining the external shape of the aircraft and
providing the designer with the mold line contour at any desired cut. CADD
(Computer Aided Design/Drafting) is a program for the geometry-oriented as-
pects of computerized graphical design. It is used first in the early stages
of design, providing routines for geometric and aerodynamic wing design on
the CRT, for internal fuel volumes and their centroid within complex shapes,
and for many other design applications which utilize the unique three-
dimensional capability of CADD. Computer routines solve complex spatial
kinematics problems like landing gear retraction and clearances or pilot's
field of vision. A second use of CADD is in production design where, for
instance, the flat pattern dimensions required by manufacturing can be laid
out both for flanged sheet metal parts or for laminated composite structures.
CGSA (Computer Graphics Structural Analysis) creates and processes finite
element models so that NASTRAN (NASA's Structural Analysis program) can per-
form a minimum strain energy solution. Then, after the designer has created
the mathematical model of a part and stored it in the computer, the manufac-
turing programmer retrieves a copy, adds tooling lugs and other manufacturing
requirements and uses GNC (Graphics Numerical Control) for the generation of
a numerically controlled (N/C) source program which defines the sculpturing
process to be executed by the N/C milling machine. The manufacturing program-
mer depicts the cutter motions graphically on the CRT and is concerned only
with geometry labels without being involved in the complex mathematics defining
the part. Finally, to assure that the manufactured part accurately represents
the design definition, the quality assurance programmer uses CAQA (Computer
Aided Quality Assurance) to generate inspection data by light pen on the CRT.
They can be transmitted to a N/C inspection machine with glass probe and print-
out of actual vs. required dimensions.
A large-scale project to explore the full potential of design synthesis
is under development at NASA as IPAD (Integrated Programs for Aerospace ve-
hicle Design) . It is directed toward collecting and developing operational
modules and integrating them into a flexible, versatile, and open-ended system
to provide automated continuity throughout the design process. Results are
not expected before 1980.
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2 .2.4 Systems Design
On the level of parametric sizing quantitative relationships between
parameters have been developed as the result of continuous efforts which have
lasted over decades. When it comes to the physical aspects of hardware de-
sign, however, we depend much on qualitative considerations. For a survey
of the problems of hardware design it will be convenient to make a distinc-
tion between systems design and structures design.
The terms system and sub-system are relative and not easily defined.
Any system is a sub-system of the universe. A transport airplane is a sub-
system for an airline which has to integrate it with other sub-systems like
passenger and cargo handling, operations, maintenance, and route structure.
Correspondingly, a military airplane is a sub-system of a vast defense estab-
lishment. From our viewpoint of aircraft design, the propulsion system,
control system, fuel system, or avionics system are typical examples of
aircraft systems. The emphasis is on a functional entity consisting of many
components
.
Each system has to deal with a different set of problems and requires
a different kind of specialized knowledge. Yet the basic approach from the
designer's viewpoint remains the same — again combining detail analysis and
overall synthesis. A functional system diagram describes how the various
components are integrated into the system but any component can be a complex
sub-system in itself.
The avionics system may serve as an example because its importance has
grown enormously and developments take place at a rapid pace. For some types
of aircraft about half the design effort is directed toward avionics. Avi-
onic sub-systems include cockpit controls and displays, autopilot and flight
controls, communication, navigation and radar as well as all the highly sophis-
ticated military systems for target recognition and acquisition, weapons
delivery and electronic counter measures. The aircraft designer is responsible
for integrating these many sub-systems which consist of equipment manufactured
by scores of separate avionic companies. The design process begins with under-
standing and defining mission objectives and environment. It continues with
the formative phase of investigating alternative solutions and making decisions
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iteratively by means of synthesis, analysis, and evaluation. Each system
consists of circuits, parallel or in series, with many discrete components.
For each of these components the probability of failure can be established
by tests; corresponding values for the system can be computed and the overall
probability of failure for the system is a clear design criterion. Yet the
simple logic of this approach is marred by the tens of thousands of active
elements contained in an electronic system and by the large number of para-
meters which have to be optimized — e.g. functional capability, maintenance
hours per flight hour, cost of development and acquisition, time schedule for
testing. Such optimization is usually done by trade-offs based on engineering
judgment. Closest cooperation with suppliers of components, realistic detail
specifications, and acceptance tests under real-life conditions are fields
of special importance where many decisions have to be made.
While the avionics system is the realm of specialists in the field of
electronics, other systems are designed by engineers who acquire specialized
experience mostly on the job. Even if other systems are hardly as complex
as an avionics system, there are basic similarities. Need for a functional
and logic diagram, component parts furnished by suppliers, redundancies vs.
single components, realistic specifications and acceptance tests — all these
are common characteristics of most systems. The designer has to begin from
the viewpoint of synthesis to understand and define objectives and environ-
ment and to arrive at alternative solutions, then has to analyze the details,
and finally has to integrate all aspects of the system. Again the probabi-
lity of failure can be established for each sub-system and system but many
other parameters with respect to function, weight, cost of acquisition and
maintenance, or time schedule have to be optimized. Probability of failure
is measured in percent, weight in pounds, cost in dollars, time in days, and
it is not always easy to establish a common denominator. Cost in dollars
is frequently a practical measure, as for instance in a noise abatement pro-
gram where the cost can be expressed as dollars per decibel. On the other
hand, the value of weight-saving which seems to be such a straightforward
consideration is not easily assessed in dollars per pound as it varies with
different design phases.
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For the decision-making process in systems design we see the overriding
importance of establishing the probability of failure at an acceptable level.
The magnitude of an acceptable level depends on the consequences incurred by
failure. For catastrophic consequences of a failure in a fleet of 200 air-
craft with an average lifetime of 50,000 flight hours each, the probability
of failure should be less than 10
2.2.5 Structures Design
Structural design is concerned with transmitting loads and moments due
to flight and ground loads. Rigorous requirements have to be satisfied at
minimum weight and it is a narrow path between too heavy and too light. Wing,
fuselage, and empennage structures have always formed the framework of air-
craft design with a pervasive continuity reaching from the conceptual to
the final design phase.
Contrary to systems which can be represented by a functional diagram
with discrete components, the typical aircraft structure serves its load-
carrying function as an integral unit. For specified loading and environ-
mental conditions the structure has to satisfy exacting requirements regarding
strength, rigidity, weight, cost, manufacturing, processing, durability,
reliability, maintainability, vulnerability, and survivability. The challenge
to the structures designer is to find the proper balance between these often
contradictory demands, and an optimal solution, just as in systems design, is
found by trade-offs based on engineering judgment. Each of these diverse
aspects has become the domain of specialists. Where there used to be the
stress engineer we have now specialists for loads, for static strength, for
fatigue strength, for fracture mechanics, for flutter and vibrations. Many
of the earlier functions of the designer have been taken over by specialists
in cost, producibility, reliability, maintainability, etc.
The analytical aspects of structural design lend themselves, of course,
to computerization. NASTRAN, as mentioned in Section 2 Q 2.3, is widely used
for the analysis of fuselage, wing, and empennage shells. Many other com-
puter routines exist for strength and aeroelasticity calculations. Yet not
much effort has been extended toward bringing quantitative and qualitative
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considerations on a common denominator and finding an optimal balance for
the inputs of various specialists.
However, an important aspect of computer-aided design should be mentioned
here. It is the drafting-oriented computerized graphical design for which
Lockheed's CADAM (Computer-graphics Augmented Design and Manufacturing) is
representative. CADAM is commercially available and offers savings in timespan
and man-hours by about 25 to 75% at reduced cost and improved accuracy. It
ranges from design concept to manufactured product and can prepare loft lines,
dimensioned drawings, perspective drawings and isometric drawings, charts,
graphs, and diagrams; can analyze structural section properties and weights;
and can provide N/C cutter tapes for the production of machined parts. The
many accrued benefits of CADAM include that repetitive details have to be
constructed only once and can be positioned and replicated on a drawing as
needed at any scale, and that design changes of common components can be
incorporated into thousands of drawings "overnight". For the designer at
the graphics terminal existing skills are enhanced rather than displaced.
2.2.6 Design Policy Decisions
Decision-making is important on all levels of design. Yet of special
importance are the basic policy decisions which are taken on the top level,
particularly during the early phases of design. They include establishment
of a value system and of priorities; approval of forecasts about future
needs and market developments; selection of major subcontractors; provision
for modifications to be anticipated from future customers; evaluation of
potential problems, particularly in connection with new developments beyond
the present state of the art; appraisal of available resources in knowledge,
experience, personnel, equipment, and funding.
In spite of an outspoken engineering flavor, these decisions are of
the same kind as corresponding decisions in other fields of management and
business administration. Uncertainties and risks often play a dominant
role and the counsel of the experienced design engineer is indispensable.
Yet only the designer who is familiar with decision-making methods in
management can expect to take an active part in such decisions.
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2.3 Recent Trends
This brief outline of typical aspects of aircraft design indicates more
sophistication in the early phases of parametric design than in the later
phases of hardware design. Yet in hardware design a new significance was given
recently to design-to-cost, reliability, maintainability and related aspects.
Each became the field for a group of specialists — but basically they remain
the designer's responsibility. With the second generation of jet transports
the airlines realized that the investment in additional design efforts paid
off handsomely in a reduction of maintenance work and unscheduled removals.
Correspondingly, the military services realized from the experience with
overly sophisticated high-performance aircraft that the groundwork required
for maintenance and repair reduced the availability of aircraft by a prohi-
bitive percentage.
Reliability may serve as an example for tha kind of considerations
which are involved. With the rapid expansion of jet transportation in the
early 1960s a large pool of practical experience became available. This
service experience was utilized systematically by aircraft manufacturers,
equipment suppliers, and customer airlines to improve reliability. It is
described by Reesing in Ref . 11 and 12 and a brief summary will give an indi-
cation of the typical design effort involved in systems reliability. The
main criterion, after flight safety, is high dispatch reliability at low
maintenance costs. Logic diagrams for the minimum equipment which must be
operating for flight safety are used to display the reliability of each item
and the corresponding delay probability. Simplicity, redundancy, and fail-
safe characteristics have to be designed into a system from the very begin-
ning. Selection and improvement of components involve much personal contact
between the designer who has to accomplish the design objective, airline
engineers and maintenance personnel who have had experience with the same
or similar components, and the equipment supplier who has to guarantee his
product. The design effort starts with searching for the best similar equip-
ment already in service, scrutinizing operational experience regarding mean
time between failures, mean time between unscheduled removals, major failure
modes, and potential improvements. Design coordination meetings have
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to be held before the design begins, during the design process, and when the
first production hardware becomes available. The input includes contributions
from customer and supplier as well as from specialists in strength, processing,
cost, reliability, maintenance, etc. The designer prepares a failure modes
and effects analysis, considering all interfaces. Probability and statistics
play a major role. Computer simulation with operational flight profile,
operating time for each piece of equipment, and failure and repair data on
the components provide as an output the probability of delay, of air inter-
ruptions, and of flight cancellations before the aircraft is ready for its
first flight. The supplier guarantees to meet established performance and
reliability values and in case they are not achieved he is obligated to ex-
tend his best effort to provide corrective action.
The success of such reliability programs can be seen from the dispatch
reliability of aircraft as complex as the L-1011 or DC-10 which is about
98%— i.e. only 2% of the flights suffer more than 15 minutes delay due to
mechanical causes. This relatively good operational reliability of commercial
transport aircraft, however, is in marked contrast to the situation for
military combat aircraft. Here the drive for maximum performance took place
at the expense of reliability. Components, particularly in electronics,
are often close to the frontiers of scientific knowledge and have not yet
reached operational maturity. Even if their reliability is satisfactory
under certain test conditions, it often deteriorates quickly under rigorous
flight conditions. Of greatest importance are testing programs in real-life
environment for each new component. Temperature, vibration, shock, accelera-
tion, humidity, altitude, salt water spray are some of the parameters — not
only their level but also the length of time and sometimes even the rate of
change.
Only recently the need has been appreciated to couple performance re-
quirements with strict reliability requirements in military procurements.
This means, just as it has been established in commercial transport aircraft,
that reliability starts at the beginning of design with clear concepts for
simplicity, ruggedness, redundancy, fail-safe characteristics, and derating
below design limits. It continues with failure modes and effects analysis,
design and producibility considerations, and leads up to quality assurance.
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The preceding considerations about reliability refer mostly to systems
design. In structures design the designer as well as the structures engineer
and materials engineer have been plagued over the last couple of decades by
fatigue, stress corrosion, hydrogen embrittlement, fracture mechanics and
similar problems which had to be attacked on a broad front of scientific
efforts with research on a large scale. Continuing research in the fields
of materials science and structural analysis can be anticipated as more high-
strength metals and filament composites are developed for structures design.
Such developments toward more scientific sophistication are one aspect of
future trends in engineering.
A very different trend, however, becomes visible in the renewed emphasis
on reliability, maintainability, and design-to-cost. Considerations about
maintainability are of a similar kind as what has been discussed about relia-
bility — an inquisitive anticipation of any difficulties which might be
encountered during the service life of the aircraft. Considerations about
design-to-cost require an awareness of the overall life-cycle cost which
includes acquisition, operation, and support costs. Often in the past these
considerations have been rendered insignificant in comparison with the impor-
tance given to performance and weight requirements. "Affordability" expresses
a cost consciousness which can account for each possible improvement in perfor-
mance, weight, reliability, maintainability, etc. in terms of cost. Among
the avoidable but typical cost drivers are budgetary considerations in Con-
gress, poor visibility of operation and support costs, or unnecessarily complex
specifications. Frequently much can be saved by limiting specification re-
quirements to the most essential aspects and encouraging the designer or
supplier to submit alternate proposals which indicate the cost of improved
performance.
Reliability, maintainability, and life-cycle cost have to be designed
into an airplane from the very beginning, just as well as performance and
weight. This requires an attitude which only now begins to be appreciated
in military procurement. The emphasis in these fields is not on research
or a scientific breakthrough but on the traditional virtues of the designer
which have been neglected lately and which are summed up in the following
section on the essence of design.
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2.4 Essence of Design
Summarizing the typical aspects of aircraft design, there are three
different fields distinguishable — each quite distinct in itself and all of
them closely interconnected. First, the overall configuration of the air-
craft has to be established, with much emphasis on the laws of aerodynamics.
Second, the structural framework has to be provided, with much emphasis on
materials science and structural analysis. Third, the functional systems
have to be established to operate the airplane and provide for the payload,
with much emphasis on practical engineering. The emphasis is on a different
aspect in each one of the three fields. Yet in each of these basic fields
of aircraft design the problems have to be approached in the same way which
is typical of design: establish the objective and the underlying value system;
find alternative solutions; set up a model and examine each possible solution
by methods of analysis and synthesis; evaluate and decide.
Beyond the complexities which may be encountered in the approach to a
design problem, there are two basic characteristics involved in a good solution,
One aspect is the designer's awareness of the immutable relationship between
cause and effect — even if the effect may become noticeable only after many
years of service. The other aspect is the designer's awareness that each
component has to be integrated into an entity and that analysis and synthesis
complement each other. Such attitude and outlook, combined with the typical
design approach, form the foundation of design.
Among the many activities which make up the design process probably the
most important and the most pervasive in its many aspects is decision-making.
All other design activities are either directed toward making a decision or
based on a decision which has been made. The designer's characteristic
approach, attitude, and outlook culminate in decision-making.
2.5 Organization of Engineering
To appreciate the decision-making process in aircraft design, it will
be necessary to lock at an important organizational aspect of engineering.
Each company has a somewhat different organizational set-up, determined
partly by earlier developments, partly by resources of personnel and know-how,
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and partly by business prospects. However, all of them have one feature
in common: there is a distinction between design-oriented and technology-
oriented engineers.
This distinction began when the complexities of design grew beyond
the capacities of a single person. The designer had to consult more and
more technology-oriented specialists and the resulting organizational structure
can be represented in form of a matrix. Each of the vertical columns indicates
a specialized technology, each of the horizontal rows indicates a design
project (and a third dimension could show sub-projects). Designers are
responsible for the entirety of their designs and they need width of
perspective to appreciate all aspects and to communicate with specialists
in many fields. Specialists are responsible for that aspect of a project
which is affected by their specialty and they need depth of perception to
understand all corresponding implications.
The difference in outlook between designer and specialist means that
a decision at any element of the matrix must take into account both the
requirements of the overall project and the requirements of the special
technology which is involved. Designer and specialists are members of
the same team and must appreciate the other's problems. The chief of de-
sign bears responsibility for the coordination of all design projects,
the chief of technology bears responsibility for the up-to-date competence
of the specialists.
These two different orientations toward either design or technological
specialty play an important role in decision-making. The matrix form of
organization is very different from the pyramid-like organization with the
chief executive at the top and the working force at the bottom where decisions
are passed down from the top. Engineering decisions of consequence are made on
every level of engineering but every decision requires a consensus between
the viewpoints of design and technology
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3. STATE OF THE ART IN DECISION-MAKING
3.1 Empirical Approach
Design involves a choice among alternatives. Therefore, decision-making
has always been an important part of design. Even in ancient times a pyramid,
an aqueduct, a bridge, or a Chinese Wall must have been the result of many
design decisions. Much more so in medieval times the architecture of a cathe-
dral, where a primitive level of analytical know-how was combined with a
supremely developed sense of synthesis.
Decisions are based either on intuition or on analysis. Intuition,
of course, reflects previous experience. Such experience is necessarily
limited for each individual and in many cases people are tempted to draw
conclusions based on an insufficient amount of evidence. Objective reasoning
and subjective feeling are often intertwined, but objectivity ends where
the ego begins. All of us are fond of believing that we arrive at our de-
cisions by logical processes — no matter how much intuition is involved.
When others arrive at different decisions, it must be obviously due to their
faulty reasoning. How can one judge who is right?
In hardware design the experienced designer has arrived empirically
at the decision-making process, based on many years of experience. After
10 to 20 years, good designers feel confident about their intuition because
their individual experience has grown into an understanding and insight about
the nature of design. They have developed a sense of competence and, depending
on the development of the individual, this may cover a broad or narrow region.
At a time when engineering education prepared the student for the prac-
tical aspects of design and when a designer had an opportunity to work on
many types of aircraft, much broad experience could be accumulated. This
situation began to change after the mid-1950s. Engineering education was
more and more directed toward analytical methods and specialization, and
many of the younger generation of designers have had an opportunity to work
only on one or two types of aircraft in a decade because new designs were
scarce. This prepared the ground for the typical development of the 1960s:
design became the product of team work. The typical team consists of the
designer and many specialists who have to contribute their skills regarding
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strength, manufacturing, materials processing, quality assurance, cost, re-
liability, maintainability, etc. Design decisions are made by a team of
peers, with the designer more or less as the "primus inter pares".
Some general observations can be made regarding these team decisions.
On the whole they seem to be working quite well unless there are adversary
circumstances. A good team spirit, expressing the "spirit of the company",
is typical. Due to the organizational set-up discussed in Section 2.5, each
team member takes part in the decision-making process. This provides a pride
of participation as well as a sense of responsibility. Besides, basic rules
of engineering common sense are usually followed: decisions are made on the
lowest level of competence; decisions are based on consensus among competent
people, not on majority vote; decisions must not be influenced unduly by
personality or authority; decisions are made by those who are most familiar
with all aspects of the problem, i.e. the members of the design team. Only
if no agreement can be reached, arbitration has to take place on a higher
level which tends to result in summary or imperious decisions and is prefer-
ably avoided. A systems engineer may have to make the trade-offs across
disciplines.
A clear distinction can be made between a team and a committee or board.
The team is oriented toward action, the committee or board toward delibera-
tion and reflection. The design is the outcome of teamwork but it is often
influenced by the input from a review board which, in case of an important
design, meets at least at the start and at the finish of the design, frequently
also at intermediate stages of progress.
As mentioned above, the empirical approach to decision-making within
the framework of a design team has generally been satisfactory in hardware
design. Much diversified experience is represented by the team members,
and intuition is coupled with analytical thinking. However, as the complexity
of design problems grows — as it always does — two basic weaknesses can
be seen: the lack of a scale for comparison and the lack of visibility.
The lack of a scale means that there is no measure for the "goodness"
of a design. This refers not only to the overall decision but also to the
many components of the decision process. There are qualitative as well as
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quantitative values and the quantitative values can be in many dimensions.
How can they be introduced into the decision-making process?
The lack of visibility for the decision-making process means that many
considerations take place inside the mind of an individual and are neither
visible nor traceable. They cannot be checked for accuracy or implied as-
sumptions and have to be taken on faith. Even if the individual can explain
them in a discussion, some aspects will remain hidden and often the individual's
memory of them may fade soon. As a safeguard, important decisions are fre-
quently written up in form of a design memo and a conscientious designer
usually keeps a design notebook or journal. Some companies are more systema-
tic than others in encouraging such practice, but invariably the pressure of
time and lack of coordination militate against it — unless there exists a
clearly established company policy to write up a design work package for each
major sub-project. This has been done by one of the large companies, based
on a soul-searching analysis of previous experience. It involves a consider-
able effort and includes problem definition, criteria, constraints, assump-
tions, needs analysis, impact statement, and an outline of alternative solu-
tions. Such a step is, of course, far beyond an empirical approach to




An analytical approach to decision-making makes use of the methods which
are employed throughout science. An initial hypothesis is verified by ex-
periments with repeatable results and followed by general conclusions; mathe-
matical techniques are used as an expression of logical thinking; a rational
framework and an orderly procedure are developed. As an outcome of such an
approach some insight should be provided about questions like: What is a
good decision? How can qualitative values be quantified? Where are judgment
and experience utilized?
No matter how decisions are made, the first step is to provide a solid
foundation for decision-making in form of problem definition and alternative
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solutions. A broad understanding of the problem's implications is needed
before necessary information can be gathered and a creative and ingenious
mind is needed to perceive alternative solutions. Without these even the
best decisions are built on quicksand.
An analytical approach to decision-making distinguishes between problems
where the design criteria are single-dimensioned or multi-dimensioned and
between conditions of certainty or of uncertainty. For a single-dimensioned
criterion under conditions of certainty, optimization is conceptually tri-
vial but often very laborious. A case of complex interactions was discussed
in Section 2.2.3 where weight was the single-dimensioned criterion and where
uncertainties were removed by simplifying assumptions. When there are mul-
tiple dimensions for criteria (e.g. speed in m/h, sonic boom in #/in
,
passenger comfort in terms of quality of life), even if they can be treated
as certain, conceptual difficulties arise rapidly. Sometimes they can be
overcome by expressing all criteria in terms of a common denominator, such
as dollars, and treating the system as single-dimensioned.
Sometimes the following procedure is used for multi-dimensioned criteria:
To overcome the difficulty with multiple dimensions, all criteria are made
non-dimensional, i.e. normalized, by using a normalizing transformation.
To overcome the difficulty that each dimension may have a different relative
importance, each dimension is assigned a relative weight between and 1.0
so that the sum of all relative weights equals 1.0. For each dimension the
normalized value is multiplied by the relative weight of the dimension and
these products are added to obtain an aggregate criterion, the criterion func-
tion. A detailed step-by-step procedure for its use is given by Ostrofsky
in Part III of Ref. 13. The fundamental drawback of this procedure is that
the interaction effects of the criteria are neglected. This may be corrected
to some extent by using different rules of aggregation for the criterion
function but interactions between criteria are not explicitly examined.
A new order of complexity is introduced under conditions of uncertainty.
Such conditions are typical of technological, economic, political, and per-
sonal decisions. Research, tests, and experience tend to reduce regions
of uncertainty but there is no way getting around the basic fact that man
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has to live in a world of uncertainties and has to provide for them in the
decision-making process. In some cases uncertainties may be disregarded as
negligible or secondary. In other cases heuristic approximation techniques
may be useful. For the purposes of this report it will be more important
to discuss some developments of a basic nature.
For over three centuries, since the time of Pascal and Fermat, mathe-
maticians have used methods of decision-making under simple conditions of
risk — like tossing a coin, throwing dice, or calculating an insurance pre-
mium. In recent decades, for solving the complex problems of our technological
world, the use of analytical models has become an important part of operations
analysis. Combining these two tools — simple decisions under uncertainty
and analytical models for complex problems — the new field of decision
analysis began to take a firmer shape in the late 1960s. The basic implica-
tions and the present state of the art in this field are not widely under-
stood yet and we will briefly summarize them as presented by various contri-
butors in References 14, 15, 16, and 17.
3.2.2 Utility, Preferences, and Information
An important step was taken when von Neumann and Morgenstern published
their utility theory at the end of World War II (Ref. 18). Starting from
some basic assumptions about "rationality", values in any dimension are con-
verted into the basic dimension of utility. This is done by establishing
preferences for the possible outcomes resulting from a decision. Bernoulli
had pointed out in 1730 already that the quantity of money is not a measure
of its true worth because it has a different meaning to the poor and to the
rich. Von Neumann and Morgenstern postulated that a rational person can es-
tablish for himself quantitative preferences not only for the outcomes of
alternative actions, i.e. value preferences, but also of gambles involving
these outcomes, i.e. risk preferences. Based on these preferences a utility
function is established in a manner that the decision-maker will be acting
in accordance with his own preferences if he chooses the alternative with
the highest expected utility.
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The utility function is based on a consistent description of the decision-
maker's preferences and it provides the means to logical deductions. Outcomes
can be in any dimension but under practical conditions they are often ex-
pressed in terms of dollars. This leads in extreme cases to the distasteful
but logical need to put a money value on human life. The value system has
to be consistent for any situation which may occur, including replacement
costs for human beings. All aspects of a problem, including those of a non-
materialistic kind, have to be considered.
Some comments are appropriate in connection with the concept of the
decision-maker's preferences. Obviously these preferences have to be stated
explicitly but often they are well hidden in the regions of the unconscious.
Neither value preferences nor risk preferences for an individual are established
offhandedly. Some introspection is required, and practical guidelines and
interview techniques have been developed to provide consistency when qualita-
tive values are quantified. When the decision-maker's preferences are known,
any competent analyst can establish the utility function and optimize it.
No further attention from the decision-maker is required. On the other hand,
for an important project the decision-maker is usually not a single person
but a group of people, possibly with a strong input from public opinion.
In this case the preferences regarding the outcome of alternatives and the
attitude toward risk are established by a team effort and again the rest is
routine work for an analyst.
Preferences refer not only to values and risk. There are also time
preferences with respect to events taking place now or later. In this field
the concept of net present value can be used as an indicator. On a more
earthy level influences of impatience and greed may be noticeable. Such con-
siderations indicate the wide range of individual preferences entering into
a value system—attitudes about time and risk as well as assessments of
technological performance, environmental influences, and human ethics. All
have to be quantified for the evaluation process.
Decision-making applies the evaluation process to available information.
Two aspects of information can be considered: deterministic and probabilistic.
The deterministic phase is concerned with the relationships among variables.
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An analytical model can be set up to show these interactions and the results
are generally obtained in form of a computer program. Sensitivity analyses
to show the influence of various parameters are usually included. Parametric
sizing as discussed in Section 2.2.1 is a typical example of the determinis-
tic phase (if uncertainties are neglected). Examination of the analytical
model can indicate the existence of uncertainties.
The probabilistic phase is concerned with uncertainties. Uncertainty
can be expressed in terms of probability as a number between and 1. Im-
possible corresponds to 0, certain corresponds to 1.0, and the various shades
of maybe correspond to the intermediate range. For a set of collectively
exhaustive and mutually exclusive elements the sum of the probabilities must
add to 1.0.
An objective probability can be based on statistics and experimentation
under substantially similar conditions. For many applications of decision-
making this is not very helpful. Often an event will occur only once and
tests to provide the amount of data necessary to assign an objective proba-
bility may be out of the question. This leads to a subjective probability
which expresses the state of knowledge about an event. After all, if we
would know exactly how a coin is held and tossed and what wind shear will
act on it, we could calculate head or tails with certainty by the laws of
mechanics. Without getting into philosophical disputes, we may generally
consider subjective probability as an application of logic independent of
statistical or experimental data. To put it quite explicitly: subjective
probabilities are assigned as a measure of our state of knowledge about a
phenomenon, not of the phenomenon itself.
To arrive at uncertainty estimates, there is no need for a decision-
maker but there is much need for the advice of knowledgeable people with
applicable experience. Special interview techniques have been developed to
eliminate personal bias as much as possible and to provide a well-considered
estimate. This estimate is clearly visible and can be modified if additional
evidence makes it advisable. A formal method for revising probability
assessments on the basis of new information is available in Bayes' Theorem.
The state of knowledge seldom remains constant and uncertainties can often
be reduced in due course of time.
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Probabilities are generally given not as a discrete value but as a pro-
bability distribution which may be in form of a bell-shaped curve. When
probability distributions are assigned to variables of the analytical model,
the outcome will also be in form of a probability distribution. Typical
examples of uncertainty and corresponding probability distribution may occur
in the field of parametric sizing when the propulsion system is still under
development and its performance data are not yet established. In the field
of hardware design probability distributions are encountered almost every-
where. What used to be a deterministic field with well-established margins
of safety, admitted the first doubts when margins of safety were recognized
as factors of ignorance, and slowly developed into a probabilistic field with
probability of failure as a major concept.
A different aspect of the quest for additional information is the need
to establish how valuable it is. The value of new information is compared
to the cost of acquiring this information. This allows conclusions regarding
the direction of new research efforts.
Summarizing the basic aspects of decision analysis which might be of
significance to aircraft design: Complex problems can be decomposed
methodically into actions and outcomes, giving due consideration to uncer-
tainties and preferences. There are methods for subjective and objective
probability assessment and for subjective utility assessment.
3 .2.3 Overall Perspective
What is a good decision? Decision analysis indicates clearly that even
the best decision cannot guarantee a good outcome when uncertainties are in-
volved. Yet a good decision is the best protection against a bad outcome.
A good decision incorporates three major steps: setting up a decision model,
establishing preferences, and assessing uncertainties. Having accomplished
these three steps means that the essence of a problem is understood. And
understanding a problem implies the logical decision.
How can qualitative values be quantified? Decision analysis provides
a clear separation between preferences and uncertainties. Preferences are
established as the decision-maker's value system. Uncertainties are interpreted
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as a part of information indicating the present state of knowledge and are
treated in accordance with mathematical laws of probability. For these two
different fields the same kind of consistent techniques has been developed
for quantification of qualitative judgment.
Judgment and experience, which play such an important but vague role
in the empirical approach to decision-making, are just as important for the
analytical approach. However, decision analysis applies judgment and experi-
ence to well-defined sub-problems which are clearly within the capabilities
of the human mind. When it comes to decisions about the more complex problems
of our technological world, the unaided human mind is overtaxed. It has
to be aided by the computer with its capacity to solve complex problems by
established algorithms. Decision analysis attempts to give to man what is
man's, namely the basic assignment of preferences and assessment of uncer-
tainties, and to give to the machine what is the machine's, namely the
meticulous attention to details, implications, and consequences.
Decision analysis is still young of age and is directed mostly toward
business administration and management. In many corporations the decision
analyst has become the close associate of the executive. It belongs to the
responsibilities of the decision analyst to help to clarify what is taking
place in the mind of the decision maker. The essence of decision analysis
is to make each part of the decision-making process clearly visible and open
to inquiry and examination.
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4. SOME PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
4.1 Anticipating Future Developments
We may start out with some considerations about the future. It seems
to be a reasonable assumption to anticipate some further lean years ahead
for the aircraft industry, followed in perhaps 5 or 10 years by an outspoken
demand for a new generation of aircraft which will incorporate recent advances
in materials, structures, control systems, and aerodynamics. New develop-
ments involve decisions between alternatives. Many of these decisions,
particularly about the application of new materials, have to be faced on
the level of hardware design. This is exactly the field where the lack of
a systematic approach to decision-making has become noticeable in recent years,
mostly in the design of new military aircraft when the proper balance between
weight, cost, reliability, and maintainability had to be found. In many
cases decisions in hardware design have to be made in the face of multi-
dimensional criteria and at present the designer is poorly prepared to do
this systematically.
An additional consideration can be based on data given by Culotta in
Ref. 3. When the precipitous slump occurred in the aerospace industry at
the beginning of the 1970s, most of the reduction in engineering manpower
took place among younger engineers. Only a negligible amount of hiring has
taken place in engineering since then. As a result, the age profile of
engineers in the aerospace industry now shows a median age in the mid-forties.
This means that in the 1980s there will be comparatively few engineers available
with experience in the aircraft industry who are in the most productive age
group of about 30 to 40 years and who are much needed for new designs.
By far the majority of engineers will be past the prime age for creative
and innovative ideas.
In design this general situation has been aggravated because for over
two decades engineering education has been tilted toward science. As a con-
sequence, design has held little attraction for promising young engineers.
Their scientific knowledge was more appreciated in research and analysis
and they shied away from the slow process of accumulating experience in
design.
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Each of these trends accentuates a situation which has been recognized
and clearly expressed by the aircraft industry for some time. There will
be a great demand for experienced designers in the foreseeable future but
no practical steps have been suggested yet to provide for this predictable
need. This is a long-range problem for which no quick solution can be ex-
pected.
4.2 Design and Decision-making
In Section 3.2 it was shown that an important concept of decision
analysis is the assignment of the decision-maker's preferences and the assess-
ment of uncertainties for each component of a design. A complex design is
broken up into discrete elements which can be judged individually by the de-
signer. Subsequent aggregations can be executed by the computer. Each step
in the decision process is visible and traceable and forms part of a logical
system. This is an outlook which is new but should have a familiar ring to
engineers.
It might be helpful to draw an analogy with the concept of systems en-
gineering which spread rapidly in the mid-1950s. When specialization began
to play an increasingly important role in engineering, the complex work of
the specialists had to be coordinated and integrated into the overall system.
This was particularly true in the space program. The systems engineer became
a new kind of integration specialist with a background in operations analysis,
logic, and mathematics.
To give a trivial example: For a component in a ballistic missile the
requirements specified a lifetime corresponding to the flight duration of
30 minutes under severe flight conditions. The component passed its proof
test under simulated flight conditions, was then installed in the missile
but failed during flight. A second component was built, tested, installed,
and failed again during flight. It took a systems engineer to point out that




As trivial as this example is, it is somewhat typical for the applica-
tion of basic common sense which is easily overlooked when everyone has a
specialized outlook. The designer took the specifications as the gospel
truth and the writer of the specifications did not have enough practical
experience to add the time for testing to the flight time. While it is
the task of the specialist to solve a clearly defined problem, the designer
must feel responsible for all aspects of the design — from the problem
definition to the integration into an overall system and maintainability in
future service — and must always be on the lookout for any potential troubles.
In this sense the designer should be considered to be the system engineer
of a design, whether it is the design of a small detail or of a whole air-
plane.
Many engineers have an aversion against the term "systems engineering"
because it often implies an emphasis on abstract mathematical analysis in-
stead of engineering experience. When the term is interpreted as design
synthesis, a design attitude which is aware of all aspects of a design problem,
no engineers object. They will point out that they have done this intuitively
all the time.
A similar situation seems to exist with respect to decision analysis.
Many engineers like to point out that this is not much different from what
a good engineer does intuitively anyhow. Yet the crucial point is that human
intuition becomes quite unreliable under complex conditions. Decision analy-
sis relies on consistent logic, orderliness, and visibility. An intuitive
approach is always on feeble grounds when it has to contend with an analytical
method or when plain credibility has to be established.*
*One is reminded of the story about Euler at the sophisticated court of
St. Petersburg over two centuries ago. He was questioned relentlessly by
the enlightened philosophers how he could consolidate his religious faith
with his mathematical genius. Finally he replied with some mathematical
formulas beyond their comprehension and concluded: ergo God exists. Fortu-
nately, however, the decision analyst has to refrain from such tricks because
it would be too easy to call the bluff.
39
Both systems engineering and decision-making are based on an abstract
logic. Systems engineering has assumed a particularly visible role in the
hardware design of Air Force projects. It is used mostly as a check-up or
bookkeeping function regarding safety, survivability, and logistics indepen-
dent of the design hierarchy. Within the design hierarchy the designer
represents the integrated viewpoint of systems engineering which coordinates
the work of specialists. The relationship between designer and specialists
affects decision-making. This relationship is somewhat different from one
company to another, often even in various groups within a company. Notwith-
standing some notable exceptions, in general the designer can be considered
to be in a weaker position than the specialist. This observation cannot
be proven quantitatively but it is rooted in basic aspects of engineering
education.
4.3 Design and Engineering Education
Engineering education has always been built on a solid scientific-
deterministic foundation. Since the mid-1950s, however, some aspects which
are typical of design have been widely neglected in favor of science-oriented
subjects. Among them are those which are particularly important for decision-
making: development of a sense for synthesis and an awareness of uncertainties,
This is the underlying cause for the present neglect in the field of decision-
making. Engineers are well equipped to think analytically with regard to
a clearly defined deterministic problem but they are in general poorly pre-
pared for the solution of complex ill-defined problems under uncertainties.
Yet these are the kind of problems which become increasingly important in
a technological world.
Some steps have been taken to ameliorate the situation. Introductory
design courses for freshmen and interdisciplinary design courses for seniors
have been introduced at several universities. New developments are taking
place in experiential learning. The Engineers Council for Professional
Development attempts to emphasize the importance of design in the accredita-
tion of engineering curricula. The magnitude of the task can be appreciated
when one realizes that it takes years to develop an analytic-deterministic
mind in the undergraduate student. It is a comparable undertaking to
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develop in the student a sense for synthesis and an awareness of uncertain-
ties.
At our universities an analytic-deterministic mind is developed in
students of science and engineering by science-oriented faculties. A sense
of synthesis and an awareness of uncertainties are developed in students of
operations research by operations-oriented faculties. These are two differ-
ent worlds. They speak somewhat different languages and there is not much
communication between them.
Decision-making in engineering design is a field where these two worlds
have to meet and where communication and mutual understanding have to take
place. The situation is aggravated by the lack of experience which science-
oriented and operations-oriented faculty members have in aircraft design
and by their lack of contact with engineers in industry who are building up
this kind of experience. There exists a triangle of non-communication be-
tween engineering faculties, operations research faculties, and design
engineers in industry. To reverse this situation by establishing a triangle
of communication is not easy. Aerospace faculties are retrenching in view
of a greatly reduced number of students and often this means just more spe-
cialization. Operations research faculties are too remote from engineering
problems. And engineers in industry are under pressure of time with every-
day problems
.
Faculties, of course, educate students in their own image. Since most
faculties are research-minded in line with the academic trends of more than
two decades, students cannot be expected to be educated for design. They
are well educated for analysis and research but the demand in these fields
has dwindled. The majority of engineering positions in industry are more
design-oriented than research-oriented. Industry needs engineers who com-
bine an analytical mind with a sense of synthesis — a rare breed in our
universities
Since so many universities have fallen short in this respect, the ques-
tion is whether engineering technology curricula or continuing education
can provide a remedy. Engineering technology programs are still in an early
stage of development and it would be premature to draw conclusions, as their
41
first graduates came out during the years when the aerospace industry could
absorb very few of them. Continuing education draws many of its teachers
from capable engineers in industry who can put their practical experience
to good use for the benefit of the students. Unfortunately there is a great
lack of design-oriented text material — a deficiency which is also strongly
felt among university faculties.
4.4 General Implications
The deliberate process of making decisions is one of the most basic
characteristics of the human mind. It is the subject of much research in
the fields of neurology, brain physiology, psychology, and their interacting
border regions. Engineering concepts are used frequently in life sciences.
By the same token, the engineer concerned with decision-making might well
be in touch with corresponding concepts in adjacent fields.
For instance, in brain physiology efforts are made to interpret the brain
in analogy both with the digital computer and with holography — two concepts
familiar to the engineer. In psychology there is a concept which may be of
special interest: When the mind is confronted with a new situation and deci-
sions have to be made, this can result either in motivation and action or,
if the complexities are overwhelming, in emotions and frustrations. This
is in line with the basic principles of decision analysis.
It is important to see intuitive and analytical approach to decision-
making in the proper perspective. Every-day life is full of decisions which
are made intuitively without any hesitation. No need exists for doing it
differently. On the other hand, there are important decisions in business
life which justify the expenditure of much time and money to consider all
aspects and consequences of a problem. Between these two extremes there is
the broad spectrum of problems where the method of approach might be some-
where between purely intuitive and purely analytical. Expense of the analy-
sis and magnitude of the problem must be kept in proportion.
It seems surprising that engineers have been largely unaware of the
developments in decision analysis. Engineers think analytically and decision
analysis should be close to their hearts. It is an anomaly that engineers
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depend on an intuitive approach when it comes to the crucial point of
decision-making. This basic situation is somewhat hidden because for engi-
neers intuition is interspersed with analytical thinking. In many cases this
may lead to the illusion that the demands of rationality have been satisfied.
It is a dangerous illusion as long as the overall logic is not clearly
established and made visible.
Beyond these considerations there is a very fundamental aspect of de-
cision analysis which has been expressed by Edwards in Ref. 19 in the form:
"Decision-making is too simple for executives to waste time on it". Execu-
tives merely have to make sure that they are in agreement with the clearly
visible input for preferences and uncertainties. The remainder is routine
for the decision analyst. This is the situation which has to be envisioned
as a consequence of the logical analytical approach discussed in Section 3.2.
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5. PROBLEM AREAS AND BASIC NEEDS
We may now try to rearrange the preceding discussion to identify prin-
cipal problem areas and to recognize some basic needs.
5.1 Decision-making — General Problem
There is a deep-rooted incongruity in the approach to decision-making
in aircraft design. On one hand, many important decisions in hardware
design are made intuitively. This is usually done by a team of competent
and experienced engineers, after due discussion, but nevertheless decisions
are taken without making the line of reasoning clearly visible and traceable
or measuring the merits of alternative solutions. On the other hand, during
the early parametric phases of design when the aircraft geometry is deter-
mined and the mission analysis is performed, decisions are based on an
analytical approach. This is done by a team of engineers who combine design
experience with an understanding of operations analysis. Even if simpli-
fying assumptions are used, they are shown clearly and decisions are based
on a visible and traceable logic and corresponding optimization.
This incongruity is generally not yet considered to be an urgent problem,
In hardware design any difficulties caused by diverse qualitative considera-
tions are solved "from experience" because the rigorous methods of decision
analysis applied to complex problems are time-consuming and outside the con-
fines of traditional engineering. Besides, the practical outlook and the
"can-do" attitude of most designers have always been inclined toward an
empirical approach, using analytical methods only as need arises for specific
problems. Therefore, an empirical approach to decision-making in hardware
design has always been considered to be satisfactory.
The present investigation starts from the premise that this situation
is not necessarily irrevocable. It was pointed out that great strides have
been taken in decision analysis in recent years and that it is anomalous
for engineers with their analytically inclined minds to be unaware of these
developments. It was also pointed out that in the foreseeable future there
can be expected to be a great demand for capable designers who have to make
decisions in the face of multi-dimensional criteria.
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As an example for multi-dimensioned criteria we have seen the present
concern about designing not only to minimum weight but also to minimum cost
and maximum reliability, maintainability and survivability. Each of them is
approached as a single objective because the designer is not prepared to find
an optimum balance among them. Quite interestingly it has been only in recent
years that these basic aspects of design rose to prominence, although
each of them is as old as design itself. Under the pressure of such trends
each major aircraft manufacturer put much effort into educating groups of
specialists in these fields. The expensive task of writing and keeping-up-to-
date manuals and handbooks in these fields was undertaken by each company
separately based on its individual experience. Much duplication of effort
took place because no centralized effort existed. This was, however, under-
standable as some companies had accumulated experience which was considered
to be proprietary. As an unavoidable by-product of this development, the de-
signer tends to become more alienated when specialists take over.
A similar situation may easily come up with regard to decision-making.
This, too, is a subject as old as design itself. It has been much neglected
but it may assume prominence at any time. No proprietary considerations exist
in this field. Would it not stand to reason to prepare the ground for a common
approach — if a meaningful step could be taken as a low-keyed effort?
These considerations about a general approach to decision-making in air-
craft design focus attention on the following basic need: A feasibility study
has to establish whether and to what extent available methods of decision
analysis are applicable to hardware design. Since no proprietary considerations
are involved, the waste of unnecessary duplication can be avoided and a moderate-
scale "seed" program may be initiated by a government agency or a private
foundation. The method of approach would be that the project investigates
several typical applications of decision-making to hardware design and pursues
each example with due regard for the viewpoints of design experience as well
as decision analysis. Each example could be investigated in cooperation with
one of the major aircraft manufacturers.
Regarding practical aspects: The cooperation of the aircraft industry
is necessary and may consist of making a few experienced engineers available
for several hours of consultation, advice, and discussion. This cooperation
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should be expected in view of the clear benefits to industry derived from
such a project. To avoid difficulties with incidental proprietary informa-
tion, the project would have to be conducted by a contractor outside the
aircraft industry. Good results at minimum expense have been obtained in
the past under similar conditions when graduate students used such projects
for thesis work under the guidance of a faculty member. Close cooperation
between engineering faculties, operations research faculties, and design
engineers in industry would be necessary.
5.2 Decision-making — Specific Aspects
No matter what the conclusions will be from the feasibility study pro-
posed in Section 5.1, there remains the general problem area of considering
uncertainties in design. The root of the problem is, of course, that proba-
bilistic aspects are generally neglected in engineering education. This
is a problem which exists independent of decision-making but is much aggra-
vated when the need for decision-making arises.
To understand uncertainties requires a background in probability and
statistics. These subjects have been developed on an abstract mathematical
level. Their application to the abstract level of parametric design causes
no basic difficulties. Their application to practical levels of business
administration and management mushroomed when textbooks were provided with
real-life examples from the world of business and economics. Unfortunately,
there is a total lack of such real-life examples from the field of engineering,
This means that even if engineering students take a course in probability
and statistics, the subject does not easily come to life as long as they
cannot apply it readily in their own field of interest.
Probabilities of failure have become important in subjects like systems
design
,
strength of materials, reliability, and quality assurance. There
are many other aspects of uncertainty, e.g. attitude of the boss, preferences
of the customer, politics, public opinion, etc. They have to be brought into
the open to bring them into proper balance with other information. Wilmotte
discusses in Ref . 20 the th ink-positive syndrome which inevitably tends to
obscure uncertainties until they become clearly visible as deficiencies.
Vandivier in Ref. 21 shows an example how this can reach crisis proportions.
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These considerations focus attention on the basic need to provide il-
lustrative real-life examples from aircraft design in the fields of uncer-
tainty, probability, statistics, optimization, and design synthesis. Such
practice-oriented text material is most essential to make designers fully
aware of the implications of uncertainty. One practical approach to obtain
such material may be in connection with the feasibility study proposed in
Section 5.1. Another practical approach may be in connection with the case
studies proposed in Section 5. A or otherwise just collecting applicable
examples from aircraft design. Only a comparatively small effort is needed
to bear much fruit.
5.3 Aircraft Design - Basic Problem
There is a wide-spread lack of recognition and appreciation for the
significance of design, for its functions and responsibilities. Until the
1950s the designer's position was held in high regard. Then specialists in
scientific technology began to take over more and more of the designer's
responsibilities. Striving for maximum performance in a special field, each
specialist made full use of scientific expertise to arrive at conclusions.
Broader overall responsibilities, however, compelled the designer to base
conclusions on practical experience and judgment. This divergence of outlook
had the consequence that the prestige of design declined at a time when
science rose in public esteem.
Such unbalance between design and technologies is contrary to the spirit
of engineering organization as shown in Section 2.5. Design is directed to-
ward integration and the designer is responsible for accomplishing the design
objective by optimal means. Technologies are directed toward specialization
and technological specialists are responsible for making full use of availa-
ble knowledge in specialized fields. Design and technology complement each
other and are organized for cooperation and coordination. They are equally
important. Both design outlook and technology outlook are solidly rooted
in the same deterministic logic of engineering sciences but design needs an
additional root in the probabilistic logic of operations research.
The reason for the ascent of specialists during the past two decades
can be seen clearly in the rapid expansion of scientific borders.
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Science-oriented specialists were needed and the universities provided them.
More recently, with increasing emphasis on the "-ilities"
,
practice-oriented
specialists are becoming more frequent (while theoreticians of operations
research also take a strong interest in these fields). In either case, more
of the designer's functions are taken over by specialists.
Many of the developments of the recent past and the near future are not
problems of technology. They are basically problems of design and illustrate
how wide the designer's range of responsibility reaches. The designer must
take responsibility for optimization of the overall system. This includes
science-oriented performance as well as practice-oriented "-ilities" —
sophisticated techniques as well as old-fashioned design virtues. Such a wide
range of concern requires the insight and competence of an exceptional person,
It means that an important part of the designer's responsibility is to com-
municate with the specialists and to understand the essence of their problems
leaving it to the specialists to find the solutions in special fields.
Provision for an adequate supply of well-educated, talented, and experi-
enced designers is an obvious necessity. Unfortunately, the harsh reality
is that most of the experienced old-time designers are getting close to re-
tirement age; that it has been very hard to attract promising engineers to
design; and that, as shown by Culotta in Ref. 3, the age profile of engir-
neering departments in the aerospace industry after the great slump of the
early 1970s predicts an outspoken shortage of engineers in their most pro-
ductive years at a time when many will probably be needed. For design the
prospects are particularly bleak because it has been handicapped for a long
time by science-oriented engineering education (see Section 4.3). As the
present old-time designers with their solid experience fade away, a new
generation of designers seems to be poorly prepared to present the case for
synthesis when technological specialists propose analytical solutions which
may be well-documented but one-sided.
This focuses attention on the basic question: will specialization take
over or will design reassert itself to demand its rightful place? This ques-
tion has been obvious and urgent at least since the early 1970s but no sub-
stantial action has been taken and the drift toward specialization has
48
continued. It is a foregone conclusion that specialization will win by
default unless decisive steps are taken toward design.
The need for a strong position of design as a balance to the present
dominance of technologies has been implicit throughout this report. Indus-
try is strongly motivated in this direction but no solution is in sight unless
enough capable designers are available. As a very fundamental step a general
awareness has to be developed for the need of a design outlook as the necessary
complement to the technological outlook. This design outlook is imaginative
and inquisitive; it is based on both deterministic and probabilistic thinking;
and it is satisfied only when all possible interactions and combinations
as they may occur under real-life conditions have been fully considered.
The need for a design outlook is recognized, to somewhat varying degrees,
throughout the aircraft industry. It is not appreciated at most universities.
As a consequence, the most promising graduates from our best universities
have been hardly aware of it. They have shied away from design because they
did not recognize the challenge of it. Much "missionary work" still has to
be done to develop a general perception of this new outlook. Computer-aided
design, system optimization, and decision-making under uncertainties are the
new challenges which have to be met but which have a basic appeal to analysis-
minded engineers. They have formed the main content of this report and they
require familiarity with sophisticated techniques. However, there is also
the very basic significance of traditional design responsibilities and they
will be discussed in the following section.
5.4 Aircraft Design — Specific Aspects
Experience has always been a most essential part of design. After 10
to 20 years of experience the designer has encountered and digested many kinds
of design problems, has recognized that not even the most methodical approach
provides sufficient guidance through the existing diversity of problems, and
has developed a design attitude which is a necessary complement to any de-
sign methodology. Such a design attitude is always on the lookout for real-
life complexities, for uncertainties and hidden parameters, for the conti-
nuity from design to operation of a product, for the relationship between
cause and effect, and for interactions between parts, between people, and
between man and machine.
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Experience cannot be learned. What can be learned, however, is a
readiness to learn from the experience of others, to recognize the root of
a problem, to understand and evaluate contributing factors, and to transfer
judiciously the lessons learned from one problem to another. The designer
traditionally has been left to his own devices, slowly accumulating this kind
of experience over decades. This is as inefficient as it can be and industry
simply cannot afford to continue along these lines.
Much valuable work has been done in the form of Engineering Case Studies —
in analogy to the cases in medicine and law which have served for a long time
as precedents for solving similar but different problems in the practice of
the profession. A large library of Engineering Case Studies was developed
during the past decade at Stanford University, supported by NSF, and is
now administered by the American Society for Engineering Education. The cases
are based on real-life experiences which are significant as examples of com-
plex engineering problems, with a detailed description of all complexities
and the considerations which finally led to the solution. Most cases were
chosen for their general applicability and only very few are taken from air-
craft design. Yet an excellent collection of cases for aircraft design
exists in aircraft accident investigations which provide first-rate material
to develop an awareness of the importance of smallest details. It would take
only a small effort to make this gold mine of experience readily available
to every student of design. An understandable reticence of the industry in
this field should be overcome by the realization that most accident investi-
gations indicate the high level of competence and conscientiousness incor-
porated in the design procedure and the role played by a combination of
circumstances and, besides, that these investigations are a matter of public
record and that there is nobody in a position to throw a first stone.
These considerations about case studies in design as well as the previous
considerations about examples for intuitive and analytical approach to decision-
making and about examples for uncertainty, probability, and statistics all
point in the same direction: there is a great need for real-life examples
from aircraft design. Availability of such examples can shorten the time
to accumulate design experience by a very appreciable factor. Implicit
in these considerations is the combination of analytical aspects emphasized
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for decision-making, system optimization, and computer-aided design and of
design experience emphasized in connection with the "-ilities".
5.5 Education for Design Engineers
There remains a very pertinent question: How can engineers be prepared
for the tasks of design and decision-making? An answer will have to start
with the somewhat resigned but realistic appraisal that hardly any early
help can be expected from universities because of the science-orientation
of present faculties. The best prospects are provided by continuing educa-
tion in close cooperation with industry. Within the present framework of
continuing education, courses can be offered in subjects like design,
decision-making, probability and statistics. The teachers would be drawn
largely from industry. Basic text material is available in all these sub-
jects but it is not aero-oriented. With the aid of well prepared real-life
examples from aircraft design, as proposed on the preceding pages, these
courses can be made meaningful and stimulating to engineers in the aircraft
industry. If such courses coincide with a clear appreciation for the signi-
ficant functions and responsibilities of design, they can provide the essential
step toward a well-balanced relationship between project-oriented designers
and technology-oriented specialists. It can be hoped that a re-orientation
toward design will take place at the universities in due course of time.
Such an approach to education for design appears reasonable and practi-
cal. It is based on the premises that a moderate-scale but effective support
can be provided by a government agency or private foundation for the develop-
ment of essential practice-oriented text material; that ample talent is available
in industry to teach such courses when this text material is available;
that a realistic effort must be focused primarily on engineers in industry
and only secondarily on engineering students at universities; and finally
that the "missionary work" mentioned at the end of Section 5.3 is an integral
part of the effort.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
Assessment of Present Situation :
a. Looking at aircraft design from an overall perspective, two major trends
can be recognized: First, during the past few years a new emphasis has
been given to the basic but long-neglected virtues of design to cost,
reliability, and maintainability. Second, in the near future a high
\ degree of sophistication will be required of the designer as computer-
aided design will be generally introduced and a new emphasis on system
optimization and decision-making is likely to develop. A new genera-
tion of designers will have to master the full spectrum from old-
fashioned design virtues to sophisticated techniques.
b. From the viewpoint of decision-making, the state of the art can be
summed up as follows: On the level of parametric sizing, much analy-
tical work is done attempting to achieve optimization and design
synthesis. On the hardware level of design, however, most major deci-
sions are made empirically by the design team — using an undefined
mixture of intuition and analysis, usually without a visible and
traceable logic for the decision-making process.
c. The approach to design and decision-making consists of a basic sequence:
establish the objective and the underlying value system; find alter-
native solutions; set up a model and examine any feasible solution
by methods of analysis and synthesis; evaluate and decide. The
experienced designer tries to do this intuitively. Yet an analytical
approach is based on recognizing the simple biological fact that the
unaided human mind is quite inapt for solving complex problems.
Complexities rise rapidly when uncertainties are involved — as they
usually are under real-life conditions.
d. Decision-making under complex conditions has been developed in opera-
tions research. The implications are simple and far-reaching. Three
basic aspects are involved:
A problem is understood only when it can be expressed clearly. For
technological problems this means an analytical model.
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Human judgment depends on a subjective value system. The decision-
maker's preferences have to be stated explicitly. They are open to
discussion and modification.
.
Human knowledge is subject to uncertainties due to incomplete infor-
mation. Uncertainties have to be assessed and revised as additional
information becomes available.
The engineer has always been inclined to employ the rational first
aspect. The two subsequent aspects are concerned with the intangibles of
real life conditions. They are characterized by human follies, limited
knowledge, and by an uncertain future. Any design has to stand up under
such real-life conditions but at present the typical designer is not fully
aware of their importance and is poorly prepared to face them.
Problem Identification:
e. On the level of hardware design, decision-making and optimization will
require a new approach emphasizing visibility and an awareness of
uncertainties and of preferences of the decision-maker.
f. The fundamental problem is that decision-making is a part of design
and that design has been neglected in engineering education for over
two decades.
Proposed Course of Action :
g. With respect to decision-making, there is a basic need to clarify
whether and to what extent basic aspects of decision analysis can be
applied to decision-making in aircraft design. This is discussed in
Section 5.1 and leads to the first recommendation in Section 7.
h. Since decision-making is a part of design, a basic concern must be
directed toward the neglect of design in engineering education. As
discussed in Sections 5.2 and 5.4, an essential step can be taken by
developing practice-oriented text material and offering design-oriented
courses to engineers in industry within the existing framework of
continuing education. This leads to the second recommendation in
Section 7.
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i. During the next decade it can be expected that recent advances in
research will pose formidable challenges in design, e.g. new materials,
fly-by-wire, control-configured vehicles, etc. However, the general
trend for engineers has been away from design for a long time. Besides,
the age profile of aerospace engineers gives a clear warning that most
of them will be beyond the prime age for creative and innovative ideas
when the new challenges arise. Unless decisive steps are taken soon,
a lack of capable designers may easily jeopardize the leading position
of the U.S. aircraft industry.
j. There is no lack of talent in specialized fields. More significant is
the question whether a trend away from over-specilization can be
encouraged. A wide-spread nostalgia and longing may be sensed in con-
nection with design-oriented terms like "old-time designer", "Dassault
approach", or "skunk works". It appears that many a capable engineer
could be attracted to design if the transition would be furthered and
stimulated by design-oriented courses in continuing education (see
item "h") and by a general awareness of the genuine need and promising
future for a design outlook as the necessary complement to the techno-
logical outlook, as discussed in Sections 5.3 and 5.5.
k. To summarize this design outlook concisely:
The designer has the overall responsibility for a design project
while each specialist has responsibility for a special aspect of it;
A hierarchical system of well-defined responsibilities reaches
from the designer of the total system to the designer of a small
component
;
At any level of the design hierarchy the designer's approach to a
design problem (as summarized in item "c") and to decision-making
(as summarized in item "d") is basically the same;
. With increasing complexities a new emphasis has to be given to




In hardware design, systems engineers who are familiar with
preferences and uncertainties usually are in an ambiguous position
because physical engineering aspects are all-pervasive and the typical
systems engineer is not familiar with them;
.
Therefore, the designer has to become familiar with the principles
of decision-making to solve routine problems regarding preferences
and uncertainties. The operations analyst will be needed for the
more complex problems.
.
Finally, as a most important point: With all the additional emphasis
on analytical aspects, the basic asset of a good designer still re-
mains a creative, imaginative, and inquisitive spirit.
1. Such a design outlook can be effective only when it is practiced by
highly capable designers. They need a solid background in engineering
science to communicate with technological specialists and to understand
their problems; a good feeling for design practice to appreciate inter-
actions and real-life complexities; and an understanding of the basic
principals of operations analysis to integrate diverse aspects as well
as to assess uncertainties.
m. This puts extraordinarily high demands on a new generation of designers.
Under present conditions these demands are met by a few rare indivi-
duals who combine background, experience, talent, and initiative and
who are quickly promoted into management. To develop this capability
in a great number of designers calls for educational vision coupled
with a high regard for practical experience. The old-time designer who
slowly accumulated decades of personal experience can be succeeded by
a new type of designer who builds on decades of stored general
engineering experience — if this experience is made readily available
in form of practice-oriented text material.
n. Design as the planning stage of engineering can also be considered
in a broader context. In a compact and characteristic form it encap-
sules the same basic problems which haunt our technological world in
many other fields, e.g. urban development, transportation, economics,
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politics, armament policy. There are capable specialists everywhere
but there is a great lack of people who have both depth of perception
and width of perspective. If this problem can be solved in aircraft
design, much may be learned for other fields.
As a final conclusion, an important point can be appreciated. Any good
decision has to be based on a consensus of competent people. This can
be reached only when a value system has been clearly established and
uncertainties have been assessed. Such a consensus must express a
full understanding of the problem. In this sense the philosopher and
the decision analyst agree: any problem holds its own solution which
becomes visible and obvious when the problem is fully understood.
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7. RECOMMENDATIONS
First, to clarify the potential role of decision-making in aircraft
design, it is recommended that a government agency or private foundation
in cooperation with the aircraft industry sponsors a moderate-scale project
in line with the discussion of Section 5.1.
Second, to take an essential step toward design education, it is
recommended that a government agency or private foundation in cooperation
with the aircraft industry takes the initiative to develop practice-
oriented text material for design courses. As discussed in Sections 5.2
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